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The United States Domestic
International Sales Corporation:
An Analysis of Its Objectives and Effects
By BRUCE WILLIAm FEucHTE1I
Member of the Class of 1978.
A S THE FOREIGN TRADE posture of the United States steadily
weakened during the 1960's, there was a substantial outflow of
United States capital for investment abroad. This outflow was caused
by several factors. The dollar had been relatively expensive compared
to other currencies. The costs of labor and transportation, in addition
to the benefits of manufacturing in foreign locations, have also been
influential.1
The Administration and Congress attempted to draft a plan that
would check this outflow and yet stay within the parameters of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).'- One proposal
sought to establish the Domestic International Sales Corporation
(DISC), a scheme which essentially allows goods produced in the
United States to be exported with a partial deferral of federal income
tax for as long as the DISC status is maintained. The deferral amounts
to a tax free loan for an indefinite period which, given today's high
interest rates, amounts to a substantial subsidy to exporters.3 In 1971,
Congress added the DISC legislation to the Internal Revenue Code.
4
1. Hearings on Tariff and Trade Proposals Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., (1970), (see testimony of Maurice H. Stans, See. of
Com., at 4417 and Paul D. Seghers, Pres., Inst. on U.S. Tax. of Foreign Income, at 2443);
1971 Idr, MONETARY FuND, ANN. REP. 9-12 [hereinafter cited as IMF, ANN. Rle.'
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, [hereinafter cited as GATT] 1954,
55 U.N.T.S. 187, Article XVI, "If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy
. . . which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports . . . it shall notify the
Contracting Parties in writing . . . of the circunistuanes making the subsidation neces-
sary." If it is determined that any other party is prejudiced or threatened then the
subsidy shall be limited.
3. The use of $100 for five yeaus at an eight percent interest rate, compounded
annually, would cost approximately $147. Since the income resulting from the use of
this money would have its tax liability deferred, if used in specified manners, it is ap-
parent that the deferral of the tax payment would be a significant subsidy to qualified
exporters. See Hufbarer, The Taxation of Export Profits, 28 NAT'L TA. J. 43, 49-57,
(1975).
4. I.R.C. §§ 991-999, as amended by the Tax Refonu Act of 1976.
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Since DISC's enactment, questions have often been raised about
the intent of Congress and about the possibility that the legislation has
only turned out to be a wasteful handout to large exporters., This
paper will examine the express and implicit intent of Congress in
passing the DISC legislation, the mechanics of the legislation and the
changes resulting from the Tax Reform Act of 1976,"1 the value of the
subsidy to the exporters, and the effectiveness of the legislation in
achieving the goals of Congress.
Where products or goods receive a subsidy it tends to cause either
a misallocation of resources or economic inefficiency.- This problem
seems to have resulted with DISC.
When the United States found itself with a much larger import bill,
it found that it had to export a greater quantity of goods in order to
pay for those imports. Since those nations selling to the United States
could not absorb more United States goods, our export pressure caused
other nations to purchase more United States goods than they had
5. 116 CONC. REc. H10,527 (daily ed., Nov. 19, 1970) (letter of Paul A. Volcker, Asst.
See. of the Treasury Dept.); STAFF OF SENATE Comm/x. ON TIlE BUDGET, 94Tx CONa.,
2
D SEss., TASK FORCE ON TAX POLICY AND TAX EXPENDITURES ON DISC: AN EVALUA-
TION OF THE COSTS AND BENEFITS (Comm. Print 1975); Hearings on Tax Reform
Before House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., (1975) (statement
by public witness, Michael J. McIntyre of Harvard Univ.) at 184; see generally Note,
6 CAL. W. INTL L. J. 154 (1975).
6. Tax Reform Act of 1976, P. L. 94-455, §§ 1063(a), 1066(b), 1101(a), (c), (d),
(e) and (g), and 2005(a) (1) of the Act [hereinafter cited as T.R.A.].
7. Assume, for example, a world trade without tariffs or subsidies. The area that
can most efficiently produce certain goods in relation to other goods will be most likely
to produce and export those goods. The reason for production in one location as com-
pared to another is demonstrable through the use of Ricardo's Comparative Costs Anal-
ysis. The analysis follows the assumption that, at full employment, to produce more of
one type of goods a reduction in the production of another type of goods must occur.
To the extent resources can be shifted from the production of one product to another,
a figure can be derived of the amount that one line of production must be decreased
in order to enable the production of an increased quantity of another line of production.
The figure of one area can then be compared to the figure of another and, If the ratio
is not the sa'me, trade between the areas will be advantageous. For example, if the
resources required in the United States to produce ten tons of wheat would correspond-
ingly produce one ton of steel, while in Japan it took the same amount of resources to
produce three tons of wheat or one ton of steel, a favorable condition would exist for
trade of United States wheat to Japan and Japanese steel to the United States. If only
one quantity of resources is available, the United States could produce at a center point
of one-half ton of steel and five tons of wheat and Japan could produce at a center
point of one-half ton of steel and one and one-half tons of wheat. If each chose to
specialize and trade at a ratio of wheat to steel between their own exchanges of resources
such as one ton of steel for six tons of wheat, then the United States would produce
ten tons of wheat, consume seven tons of wheat and trade three tons of wheat to Japan,
earlier contemplated." This circumstance raises a question about the
ill effects of DISC on the relatively poor developing nations and their
consequent deficit in the balance of trade. However, since the effects
of the DISC legislation are difficult to pin down, domestically and
abroad, there are as many opinions on the legislation and its usefulness
as there are people who have given thought to it. The amendments of
the Tax Reform Act of 1976 may not have a chance to be empirically
demonstrated because the Carter Administration is entering the scene
simultaneously. Also, due to the attitudes of the new Administration,
it is unlikely that DISC will survive in its present form.1o
The best methods available for increasing United States exports
to finance more imports are easy to suggest, but are often difficult to
implement for policy reasons." Despite its defects, it is difficult to say
Japan would be willing to give up one-half ton of steel for the three tons of wheat and
end up with the same amount of steel but more wheat. Both countries have the same
amount of, steel that they had before the specialization and both have more wheat. It
can be shown that if one nation is less efficient in producing both goods, trade can still
be advantageous to both trading partners when the comparative costs are not equal in
the two countries. If the United States decides to subsidize all of its exports, the United
States producer of wheat will require less steel for the same amount of wheat to receive
the same profit. If the wheat producer chooses to require the same exchange rate there
would be a greater profit since there is the same income plus the subsidy and other pro-
ducers of goods will choose to enter into exporting in order to share the increased profits.
As the subsidy increases, more wheat will be sold for steel so that aggregate United
States demand for wheat will be unfulfilled and the point of equilibrium will be thrown
off. Once the economy is viewed as a whole, it is demonstrable that something which
would not have been exported in a market without tariffs or subsidies, but would only
be produced to the extent of domestic demand, will now be produced with the imple-
mentation of an export subsidy either in a greater amount or in the same amount but
with more to be exported instead of sold domestically. The consequent change in trade
is less -efficient as shown by the comparative cost analysis. See generally J. LEMcInt,
BALANCE OF PAvxyimrs AiN EcoNomic GnowTm 168-77 (1959); H. Hm.LW, IrNTm-
NATIONAL TRADE THEORY AND E anucAL EvIDEN E 202-04 (2d ed. 1973); regarding
trade protectionism's cost see D. SNIDa, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOmICS
235-38 (6th ed. 1975).
8. U.S. DEPARTmEr OF CoamsEce, OvEnsmAs BusiNEss RErorrs, UNTrrE STATEs
FOREcN TRADE ANNUAL 1969-1975 (May 1976) [hereinafter cited as OBR 1976] at
4-6, tables 2 and 3.
9. See note 5, supra; see also, Hearings on Small Business Tax Reform Before Senate
Comm. on the Budget, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., (1975) at 912 (statement by Oliver Vard,
Pres. of the Smaller Bus. Assn. of New England); Hearings on Tax Reform Before House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., (1975) at 462 (testimony by Reginald
H. Jones, Chairman of General Electric Co.); Hearings on DISC Before Senate Comm.
on Small Business, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., (1975) at 12 (statement by Kenneth NV.
Haggensen, Exec. Vice Pres. of WIS. State Chamber of Com.).
10. The Carter Administration's emphasis toward the lower income consumer and
away from assistance to business, Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1977, at 1, col. 5.
11. To cause an increase in United States exports, a further devaluation of the
dollar would be a possibility if there were a trade deficit in the semi-free floating ex-
change rate. Subsidization, as well as encouragement through tax incentives upon export
goods of a specified nature, would increase production and the exportation of the
specified goods.
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that DISC is not the best method available during the present period
of United States export adjustment.
I. LEGISLATIVE THOUGHT: THE PURPOSE OF DISC
It is difficult to believe that Congress acted almost to the full extent
of the Nixon Administration's recommendations on the basis of the
simplistic reasons offered by the Administration for the DISC legisla-
tion. The goals for DISC, as stated by the Administration, were to
improve the tax position of the United States exporter and to slow
down the outflow of United States capital to other countries.12 The
time setting of the proposal indicated other problems that the DISC
legislation was to deal with. It was the combination of the stated
purposes with the purposes which were implicit in the discussions
surrounding the DISC proposals that appear most important in the
approval of DISC.'
During the 1960's, the United States balance of payments declined
in every year except 1968.14 As the trade surplus fell from $6 billion
in 1962 to $1 billion in 1969 and United States foreign aid increased,
a huge outflow of capital and resources developed. 5 It was often sug-
gested that without high defense expenditures a near equal balance
of trade would be satisfactory, but because of the defense expenditures
massive surpluses of trade were required.1" One unspoken motive be-
12. Hearings on Tariff and Trade Proposals Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
91st Cong., 2d Sess., (1970) at 198; Hearings on Tariff and Trade Proposals Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., (1970) at 2436.
13. Repeated in all reports to the Congress by the Treasury Dept. on DISC; STAF,
OF DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REPORT TO THE HOUSE COiMn,. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
93D CONG., 2 D SEss., FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TulE TREASURY
ON THE OPERATION AND EFFECT OF THE DoMzEsmc INTERNATIONAL SALES CORPOIIATION
LEGISLATION (Comm. Print 1974) at 1 [hereinafter cited as DISC REPORT 1]; STAFr
OF DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REPORT TO THE HousE Comm. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
94TH CONG., 2D SESS., SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TilE TI1ASUIY
ON THE OPERATION AND EFFECT OF THE DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL SALES CoRvoirIoN
LEGISLATION (Comm. Print 1975) at 1 [hereinafter cited as DISC REPORT 11]; STA1vr
OF DEPARTMENT OF THE TnEASURY REPORT TO THE HOUSE Comm. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
95TH CONG., 2D SEs., THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DEPARITMENT OF T119 TIEASURY
ON THE OPERATION AND EFFECT OF THE DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL SALES CORPORATION
LEGISLATION (Comm. Print 1976) at 1 [hereinafter cited as DISC REPORT 11]; sea
also, Hearings on Tariff and Trade Proposals Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., (1970) (testimony of Maurice :H1. Stans, See. of Com. at
4417, 4420 and testimony of David M. Kennedy, See. of the Treasury) at 499.
14. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE U.S. EXPORT AND IMI'ORT
TRADE, REPORT F.T. 990 (Jan. 1975) [hereinafter cited as HicnLmiGITS OF U.S. TRADE];
OBR 1976 at 5, table 2 for post-1968.
15. OBR 1976 at 5, table 2 at 21, table 9.
16. OBR 1976 at 21, table 9.
hind DISC was to create a surplus of trade with the developed nations
and thus be able to provide assistance to the less developed countries
and shift resources to those nations that needed production from
abroad.
The Treasury had several other schemes to deal with the declining
foreign trade. One was a rebate of taxes paid on exported goods. This
method of subsidy would be permitted under GATT only if it was ap-
plied to certain taxes, such as value added taxes, rather than corpo-
rate taxes.17 The problem was whether the system of taxing should
be totally changed from direct corporate taxation to a value added
sales taxation or develop another alternative. Another proposal was
essentially the same as the DISC proposal as it was later revised and
approved by Congress. One of the reasons DISC was selected, instead
of the rebate proposal, was that DISC was believed to be within the
GATT provisions. 18
In every committee of Congress in which DISC was argued, the
stated purpose of the legislation was simply to improve the United
States balance of trade by promoting exports and to encourage capital
investment in the United States rather than abroad.'9 Much of the
testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means concerned
the need to equalize the trading situation of United States exporters
with other exporters and the insistence that the legislation have an
assurance of permanence or at least a definite period of operation.20
The discussions of DISC during the Hearings on Tariffs and Trade
did not clearly indicate whether the speakers expected DISC to im-
prove trade nor did they clearly indicate what the underlying motiva-
tion was in regard to the proposal. These motivations, however, can
be illuminated by exploring the other matters relating to trade that
were being discussed at the same time as the DISC proposals.
The two primary fields of interest were: first, energy problems and
increasing oil imports; and second, the disadvantages facing United
States manufacturers competing with producers abroad, primarily in
17. GATT, art. XVI. As general exceptions to GATT, see arts. XVIII, XIX, XX,
XXI, XXIII, and XXXIII.
18. Id.; Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., (1970)
at 198; Hearings on Tariff and Trade Proposals Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., (1970) at 527-28.
19. See note 12, supra.
20. Hearings on Tariff and Trade Proposals Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., (1970) at 4418 et seq.; Brundo, Treasury's New DISC
Proposal Offers a Possible Tax Break to Exporters, 33 J. OF TAx. 74, 77 (1970).
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textiles, shoes and steel.2 1 The latter concern brings to mind either
quotas or tariffs to protect domestic production or a scheme similar to
foreign policies encouraging exports by subsidies. DISC is, in fact, a
subsidy to exporters and thereby decreases the advantage of foreign
producers. However, DISC assists all producers who choose to export,
heedless of whether they are a white elephant which should be phased
out by a normally functioning economic system or a dynamic competi-
tive field. Since the purpose of DISC is to encourage the development
of domestic manufacturing plants, the concern for efficiencies of spe-
cific systems did not appear to be primary. Instead, the primary con-
cern appeared to be the protection of United States jobs by assisting
United States products to compete abroad and by encouraging capital
investment in the United States.
The fact that energy was discussed simultaneously with DISC dur-
ing the Hearings on Tariffs and Trade is indicative of the concern of
Congress over the fact that the United States was becoming increas-
ingly dependent upon foreign energy sources. These discussions were
held before the dramatic increases in the price of OPEC oil in 1971.
An underlying purpose of DISC not directly discussed at the Hear-
ings was raised by Mr. Strackbein, President of the Nation-Wide Com-
mittee on Import-Export Policy, in his testimony to the House Ways
and Means Committee regarding import quotas for the purpose of
increasing the ability of United States manufacturers to promote do-
mestic growth without the interference of imports. He indicated that
the United States economy could grow as it did in the earlier part of
this century, without imports. What Mr. Strackbein neglected to take
notice of was the rising price of imported oil and gas. To pay for the
imported energy, this country requires increased exports. If impQrt
quotas are levied, then other nations may retaliate, which will decrease
the amount of United States trade with those nations.
22
Retaliation by other nations to an import quota and tariff system
would mean less trade in imports as well as in exports. Decreased
exports would limit the ability of the United States to import and
United States domestic growth, which Mr. Strackbein insists can be
completely internal, would be without the required energy source.
21. See Hearings, supra, note 20 at 1-4413, discussions on H.R. 16920 on Import
quotas of textiles, H.R. 14870 on import quotas on foot wear and H.R. 132 on import
quotas for steel products plus supplementary bills for the three above. See specifically
remarks of Rep. Edmonson, at 2403, on oil imports.
22. See, Hearings, supra, note 20 at 883, "The United States market is large enough to
encourage growth entirely internally without the need for imports or exports ..
Strackbein concluded that quotas and protective tariffs should be established.
By comparison, DISC is a scheme to increase exports with minimal
resistance from abroad, so that the United States will be able to finance
its energy purchases. DISC never- appeared to be adequate to spur
the increases necessary for this country's growing energy demands,
but it is possible that the Administration believed the approval of DISC
would give producers a pro-exporting attitude.
This encouragement to export, in conjunction with the devaluation
of the dollar, may have been the factor which increased United States
exports dramatically." It is unquestionable that the devaluation was
the largest factor. However, getting manufacturers to "think export '
may be the next largest factor .2
4
The smaller producers will not necessarily "think export" after de-
valuation of the dollar, unlike the large trade-oriented firms. This re-
sponse is due to the fact that the firm which had not exported goods
prior to the devaluation is less likely to appreciate the profit incentive
to export by the devaluation and is unable to immediately shift from
selling domestically to selling abroad because of the necessity of a
business organization to trade through. The smaller firm will require
more time to develop a market for its goods abroad since it does not
have the mechanisms of foreign trade available. Comparatively, export-
ing multinationals already have their exporting organization operating.
The stated purposes of the DISC legislation may have been insuffi-
cient to warrant such legislation. However, with the implicit purposes
in mind the legislation seems more justified. The goal of increased ex-
ports through the equalization of tax treatment to exporters could have
been accomplished through the mechanisms of GATT to remove the
tax incentives of other nations to trade. The desire to improve the
employment situation could have been dealt with through an entirely
domestic expenditure by government. Even the stemming of the out-
flow of United States capital and technology could have been achieved
by other incentives, such as domestic tax breaks. Overall, the combina-
tion of the express and implicit goals of DISC may have warranted that
legislation instead of the alternatives.
It was pointed out to Congress several times that the legislation
needed an appearance of permanence to be effective in getting non-
exporters to shift their sights and accept the risks of exporting as well
as to encourage the large multinational corporations to use capital ear-
marked for investment abroad to construct production facilities in the
23. DISC REPORT II, ch. 5; see IMF, INrEiNATioNAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS, 1975
ANN. REP. on the United States.
24. id.
DISCIssue
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United States and export their products to the area of greatest de-
mand.25 Certain goals of the legislation, such as getting non-exporters
to "think export" and to slow down capital investment abroad, may
not have been achieved because of the business community's lack of
confidence in the permanence of DISC.
2 0
The purposes of the legislation, to deal with problems of United
States goods' competitiveness and the rising expenditures on imported
oil, are found in the express language of the Congress and in content
of discussions surrounding the proposal. Further analysis of the effects
of DISC will follow a brief outline of the mechhnics of the DISC
provisions.
I. MECHANICS OF DISC
To understand the discussion of the effects of the DISC legislation
it is necessary to see what DISC is, how it is used and what effect it
has upon its users. The DISC provisions are complicated in statutory
language, especially as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1976. A
brief explanation of DISC and what aspects an exporter needs to ex-
plore before using DISC are important for an understanding of the
general effects of DISC.
Initially DISC amounted to a paper corporation which acted as a
conduit for exports of its parent corporation, individual, partnership or
any combination of the above.2 7 A DISC could act as a wholesaler, or
as an agent, known as a commission DISC.2 8 The commission DISC
has been the primary use of DISC with approximately seventy-one
percent of DISC's acting as such.2 9 The DISC must have a minimal
separate identity apart from its parent, to the extent of separate rec-
ords and bank accounts, though both may be stored and noted in tei
same memory system of a computer.30 Generally, DISC's are non-taxed
corporations with a specified share of the income deemed to be dis-
tributed to the shareholder who is then taxed on the dividends, re-
gardless of whether it has been distributed.3 1 The greater the share of
25. See note 20, supra.
26. Hearings on Small Business Tax Reform Before Senate Comm. on the Budget,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., (1975) (testimony by Oliver Ward, Prws., Smaller Bus. Assn. of
New England) at 912, 918.
27. I.R.C. § 992(a)(1).
28. Id.; see also Treas. Regs. § 1.992-1(a) (1).
29. DISC REPORT III, at 16, table 3-4.
30. Rev. Rul. 75-428, 1975-2 Cum. Bull. 309; see also Rev. Rul. 72-166, IRB 1972-
15, 17 for the minimal requirements.
31. I.R.C. § 992(d)(2), Treas. Regs. § 1.992-2(d)(2).
income that can be attributed to the DISC, the greater the amount of
income which will have its tax liability deferred for an indefinite time.
The tax deferral of the amounts not deemed to have been distributed
is the essence of the DISC provisions.3 - As long as the DISC qualifies
under the code, the deferral exists for accumulated income not deemed
to have been distributed to the shareholders. Even assuming that the
deferral is not indefinite, because of the loss of qualification or because
of repeal of the DISC provisions, in effect it is still a tax and interest-
free loan.33
The amount deemed distributed to the shareholder, prior to the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, was the interest on producers loans, 4 certain gains
not yet taxed on the sale of capital assets35 and then fifty percent of
the remaining income of the DISC.30 Also, an amount was deemed dis-
tributed for the foreign investment attributed to the producers loans,
which was a share of total foreign investment of the shareholders of
the DISC. The new provisions amending section 995 of the code re-
move the income attributable from sales of military property, fifty per-
cent as described earlier and fifty percent deemed to be distributed by
new section 995(b) (1) (D). A DISC with adjusted taxable income
of $100,000 or less will then proceed in essentially the same manner
as before the amendment regarding deemed distributions.3 7 All other
firms have one other key provision of deemed distribution to deal with
before the fifty percent figure is removed from the tax exempt status.
The new provision sets a premium on export growth and if no growth
32. See generally I.R.C. § 992.
33. Acts as an interest free loan, see note 3, supra, and I.R.C. § 992(a)(3),
(b)(3)(A), (B) and (C)(2) and (3).
34. I.R.C. § 995(b)(1)(A). A producers loan is defined in I.R.C. § 993(d)(1)
and the limits on producers loans are found in I.R.C. § 993(d)(2),(3) and (4). The
prqducers loan is one of several uses for the untaxed income to the DISC. To be a
qualified export asset, the loan shall only be to the extent that the borrower Is increased
assets involved in the production of exportables in the United States or to the extent
of research and development for the products which are exportables. The loans are
allowed for a maximum of five years. Therefore, to renew the loan the borrower must
increase its export oriented facilities or have research and development in exportables
to the extent of the renewed loan as a qualified export asset.
35. I.R.C. § 995(b)(1) (B) and (C) which also includes the sale of § 1231 property.
36. I.R.C. § 995(b) (1) (D) prior to the T.R.A. Once the DISC has figured its own
income, certain amounts will be deemed received as a dividend distribution by the
shareholder. Fifty percent of the excess of the taxable income of the corporation will be
deemed to be distributed to the shareholder and thereby taxed. It is the remainder of
the DISC income which will not be taxed until the DISC no longer qualifies as a DISC.
37. I.R.C. § 995(f) as amended by T.R.A. § 1101(a) resulting in §§ 995(b)(1)(D)-
(E); 995(b)(3); 995(e)(4) and 995(f). By separate provisions, the income from the
sale of military property is removed from the tax exempt status: the first fifty percent
by new section 995(b)(1)(D) and the remainder by section 995(b)(1)(F), which
was previously § 995(b) (1) (D) in the earlier Code.
issue DISC
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in gross receipts of exports is reported for a period of three to four years,
little benefit will be available through DISC, as will be indicated in
the explanation of the new provision. The provision allows for a dis-
tribution of the taxable income to the extent of sixty percent of the
fraction of a base period gross receipts figure over the current year's
taxable income. 8 Other additions to the DISC provisions are liinita-
tions arising from involvement with international boycotts" and a loss
of a business deduction for bribes to both foreign and domestic govern-
ment officials.40 Finally, if certain properties exported do not have at
least fifty percent of their fair market value from manufacturing they
will be excluded from the qualified exports and all income from the
sale of such property will be deemed to have been distributed to the
shareholders, ' thus, payment of tax on that income is not deferrable,
The advantage of DISC, as explained above, is the deferral of tax. This
deferral works as a subsidy to the extent of the value of the deferral's
present discounted value.
To qualify as a DISC a special filing is required 42 and certain
standards must be met.43 There has been a great deal of discussion
about these qualifications. 44 The law requires that the DISC sell United
States produced goods.4 ', The goods must not be among those goods
38. I.R.C. § 995(e) as amended by the T.R.A. Under the new section the prcsent
year's adjusted taxable income will be multiplied by the adjusted base period's gross
receipts, which will be divided by the present year's export gross receipts. The quotient
will be the amount which is deemed distributed to the shareholders prior to figuring the
fifty percent deemed distribution. The remainder will be the portion exempt from pres-
ently paying tax. The adjusted base period export gross receipts are sixty-seven percent of
the average of four, five, six and seven years back. However, before 1980 the base years
are 1972-75. Any year that the DISC did not exist the base year will be deemed to
have had zero income, thereby reducing the average. It is obviously preferrable to have
a small numerator in relation to the denominator.
39. I.R.C. § 999, added by the T.R.A. reduces the tax exeimpt status of the DISC
income only in relation to the involvement with the international boycott and only
when the involvement was for more than thirty days in a taxable year.
40. I.R.C. § 995(b)(1)(F)(iii). The new section disallows the business deduction
of illegal bribes, kickbacks or other payments to government officials and will deem
the amount so paid as distributed tb the shareholder.
41. I.R.C. § 993(c). The section is to discourage the export of goods receiving cer-
tain depletion allowances and to deprive the sellers of such property of a secondary
advantage.
42. I.R.C. § 992(b) (1).
43. I.R.C. § 992(a) (2).
44. Brundo & Swayze, Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISC), 204-2nd
T.M., which includes the Treasury's publication, DISC - A Handbook for Exporters,
Rendell, Use of a DISC to Reduce Federal Income Tax on Export Earnings, 11 SAN
DiEco L. R. 138 (1973); see also Treas. Regs. §§ 1.992-1.996.
45. I.R.C. § 993(c)(1)(A)-(C), excluding property in § 993(c)(2) and (3).
expressly proscribed by Congress.4" The DISC must sell ninety-five
percent of its entire gross receipts in such qualified export items to fall
within the provisions of the DISC Act.4- Also, the total of the assets of
the DISC must be at least ninety-five percent qualified export assets.48
The stock of the DISC corporation must be of only one class and have
a par or stated value of at least $2,500 on each day of the taxable year.49
In practice, the general qualifications have not been found to be
onerous since only those goods which can qualify need be sent through
the DISC conduit. Perhaps the greatest problem met by DISC share-
holders has been investing in qualified export assets. In the earlier
periods of DISC there was uncertainty as to what would be the most
beneficial of the accumulated deferrals. There was discussion on all
sides, some said that producers loans were best, others suggested that
trade receivables were best.ao With the uncertainty of what was a
qualified export asset in the early utilization of DISC, there was a flow
of capital into the Export-Import Bank of the United States and a flow
of capital into assets usable by the DISC for exporting, for example,
storage and transportation facilities. 51
Time has proven trade receivables to be the more advantageous to
exporters since the receivables are large in proportion to income of the
46. I.R.C. § 993(c)(2) including certain leased property, patents, licenses, inven-
tions, models, designs, processes, copyrights, goodwill, trademarks, trade brands, fran-
chises, and products of a character with respect to which a deduction for depletion is
allowable under I.R.C. § 611.
47. I.R.C. § 992(a)(1)(A), defined in § 993(b).
48. I.R.C. § 992(a)(1)(B), defined in § 993(b).
49. I.R.C. § 992(a)(1)(C).
50. Qualified export assets are such property as: inventory, which was the lion's
share of the qualified export assets in the first year of use (see DISC REPoarr I); working
capital; facilities used in the exporting process; deposits with the Export-Import Bank
of the United States; trade receivables and producers loans. See Considine, The DISC
Legislation: An Evaluation, 7 N.Y.U.J. OF IN'L L. AN POL. 217 (1974), for a dics-
sion of the advantages of the producers loan over the use of the other qualified export
assets. Producers loans like DISC's generally are acceptable in a growing market which
will require increasing production, storage and transportation facilities for exporting.
The mature market cannot absorb producers loans since there is not a need for the
greater facilities or production. To renew a producers loan after the five year maximum
term, the producer borrower must show an increase in export related facilities of the
amount of the new or renewed loan. The Treasury Dept. has accepted the use of un-
identified trade receivables as qualified export assets. Treas. Regs. § 1.993-2(d)(1).
Trade receivables have been found to be the most advantageous use for the qualified
export assets, see DISC REPORT III, at 9. A big advantage of putting a DISC's non-taxed
dollars into its parent's trade receivables is that it softens the export financing crunch
of the parent company. Rhoades, Is a DISC Really Worthwhile? INcomEs TAXAmoN OF
FOr-ION RELATED TRANSACTIONS (1976) § 4.51. Rhoades believes that after three years
the only reasonable use of funds is producers loans, id. at 4-218. He then noted that
between five and ten years is the maximum usable life of a DISC. See also note 52,
infra.
51. DISC REPORT III at 9, 19 and table 3-5.
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DISC and the ability to put untaxed money into the receivables solves
one of the major financing problems of the parent companies.5 2 In ex-
porting, note and account receivables have a tendency to be slow in
payment, so the exporter finds much of the company's cash and work-
ing capital tied up. DISC money is a ready and inexpensive means to
finance the receivables and has therefore helped to equalize the cost
of trade abroad with the cost of trade domestically.
5 8
The problem of longer term receivables is another factor in the
higher profit margins the exporters insist upon. It is interesting to note
that there has been legs actually distributed to the shareholders than
the amount which has been deemed to have been made to the share-
holders. 54 Logically, this practice enables the parent shareholder to
take advantage of the DISC benefits in the income from the qualified
assets, except the interest paid on producers loans. Earlier the concern
of practitioners appeared to be how to get the accumulated earnings
back to the shareholder. 55
The practitioner, in conjunction with the exporter or his accountant,
should first explore the different alternatives to properly decide which
method will be used for any product line to be sent to a particular
locale. For any given situation the use of a DISC may or may not be
the most advantageous method of exportation. The exporter should
compare the DISC advantages to possibilities such as the Western
Hemisphere Trading Corporations (WHTC), a Foreign International
Sales Corporation (FISC) in conjunction with a DISC, foreign sub-
sidiaries, foreign branches, producing abroad and several other trade
choices. 56 The WHTC is being phased out by the 1976 Tax Reform
Act"T and by 1980 it will no longer be an available alternative. It
should be noted that the repeal of DISC would simply mean a return
52. Hearings on Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., (1975) (statement by Reginald H. Jones, Chairman of the General
Electric Co.). Jones stated that the financing of DISC alone allows for greater export
trade, since without it more income from domestic trade is required to finance the export
trade. Without DISC, General Electric would be forced to reduce exports becauso of
the financing situation.
53. Id.
54. DISC REPoRT III at 10.
55. From discussions in 1976 with legal practitioners of smnUill exporting clients.
56. For a discussion comparing advantages of different methods of exportation seu
Symposium: International Business Transactions - Tax and Non-Tax Aspects, 5 DEN,
J. oF INT'L L. AND POL. 1 (1975); Symposium: Foreign Sale of U.S. Goods: U.S. and
Foreign Taxes; DISC and Its Alternatives: 31 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. oF FED. TAX, 721-754
(1975). The practitioner should at least be aware of the variety of possibilities open to
clients for trading abroad.
57. § 1052 of the T.R.A. phases out I.R.C. §§ 921-922 as of December 31, 1979,
by the big exporters to tax haven countries and an outflow of capital
for production abroad with the small exporters taking the brunt of the
repeal, as some will have expanded their capabilities expressly for the
purpose of exporting. The small exporter will then be faced with the
decision of whether to continue to export a product which, without
some encouragement, is not profitable to export and, at the present
domestic demand for the product, does not warrant a local production
of such quantities.
The smaller exporters may be able to make capital investments
abroad if the demand for their product is great enough to warrant such
production. They would simply allow the earnings to remain abroad as
a further capital investment to take advantage of the lower tax rates.
The larger multinationals are currently following this procedure and
are certain to return to it in great numbers if there is a reduction in the
DISC advantages. Inhibiting the outflow of capital for such purposes
was one of the express considerations of the DISC legislation." "
Another method would be to set up a subsidiary or branch office
abroad and, if the foreign tax rate is lower, set up intercompany pricing
to place most of the income in that country. Intercompany pricing, for
exporters with subsidiaries and branches abroad, has been a major prob-
lem and a source of uncertainty because the Internal Revenue Service
decides whether the price charged by the parent to -the subsidiary is
an arms rength transaction price and, if not, they may determine what
the price ought to be.
59
When the IRS does determine that the price charged was inade-
quate, the income of the company in the United States becomes larger
than originally reported. This determination takes place after the com-
pany has paid taxes to the government abroad and it is questionable
whether that nation would give a rebate for the increased United States
tax liability. Thus, the company would be liable for paying a tax on the
same income in two places. Understandably, other nations are becom-
ing less willing to shape their tax policies to conform to the policies and
decisions of the United States Internal Revenue Service.
Within the DISC provisions, Congress included a method of dealing
with the intercompany pricing problem so as to give certainty and,
usually, the "best of both worlds" to the exporter.60 The pricing be-
58. See note 12, supra.
59. I.R.C. § 482.
60. I.R.C. § 994.
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tween the DISC and its producer - shareholder is possible by three
general methods, with some variations allowed upon the methods
chosen. Generally, the means available are the four percent margin
method, the fifty-fifty rule on taxable income, and the method used
from section 482, as described earlier."l Since most DISC's have been
making more than four percent on their gross receipts, and since the
section 482 method has some uncertainty problems,0 2 the fifty-fifty
rule is most widely used.0 3
The Code allows for a marginal costing method when using the
fifty-fifty rule for special circumstances. However, the Treasury De-
partment has taken a liberal view in allowing anyone to use the meth-
od.6 4 Marginal costing will put a greater share of the income into the
DISC and, therefore, more tax liability is deferrable.
The intercompany pricing in the DISC provisions makes a great
deal of sense for the simplification of a United States exporter's pricing
decisions, but it is also understandable that the Congress is unwilling
to allow it in trade with foreign subsidiaries. This disallowance is due
to the fact that the money under DISC is still available to the United
States Treasury under a deferral system, while in other foreign trading
the money leaves the reach of the service. The income is considered
to have been made elsewhere and is taxed by another sovereignty.
If DISC is repealed, the Congress should seriously consider some
type of pricing rule, as in the DISC provisions, in order to provide a
clearer route for United States exporters. Removing the uncertainty
61. Id., the four percent method is such that the DISC earns no more on the sale
of the product line than four percent. The only time the four percent method would
be used, therefore, is when the parent and DISC income combined Is less than eight
percent. The fifty-fifty rule generally is to set the intercompany price at the end of the
year such that both the DISC and the parent show one-half of the total profit on the
sale of the product line. Treas. Reg. § 1.994-2(a) provides that where a DISC Is seeking
to establish or maintain a foreign market for sales of an item, product, or product line
the marginal costing may be used with the fifty-fifty rule. The Treasury Dept., In Treas,
Regs. § 1.994-2(a) and (e), indicates that the marginal cost method is generally usable.
There are some limitations such as a no loss rule for the parent and a limit called the
overall profit percentage in Treas. Regs. § 1.994-2(b)(3). The desire Is to put the
greatest share of profits into the DISC. See, Marginal Costing and Other Recent Develop-
ments, TMM 73-06 (Mar. 19, 1973) at 3. A general description of § 482 pricing can
be found in LaMont, Multinational Enterprise Transfer Pricing and the 482 Mess, 14
COL. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 383 (1975).
62. Id.
63. DISC REPoRT III at 7, showing the net income of all DISC's was 7.1%1; most
DISC's have used the fifty-fifty rule.
64. I.R.C. 1.994-2(b) (2). For a thorough explanation of the use of marginal cost-
ing in DISC pricing see TMM 73-06, supra, note 61. In figuring marginal costs, one
need only deduct direct labor, direct materials and the export promotion expenses. These
can ultimately be added back, up to ten percent of the amount of export promotion
expenses.
which presently exists in section 482 would eliminate the increased
risk involved in exporting. It would also encourage the trade of goods
which have slightly lower profit rates and would therefore result in a
greater willingness to export. It is the removal of the uncertainty as well
as the improvement in the price received that would encourage trade.
IMI. EFFECTS OF DISC
A discussion of the effects of the DISC legislation is in order to
determine whether it has achieved the desired goals, but clear analysis
is difficult because of the collective flux and set of events which have
occurred in United States trade since the legislation was first proposed.
In 1971, the President imposed price controls on nearly all United
States goods. Exported goods were an exception.0 5 Along with these
price controls, a devaluation of the dollar occurred in 1971 and 1973.
While the United States economy was changing, the international trad-
ing world adopted a system of semi-floating exchange rates. 6
Since 1971, the Western trading world has experienced a great in-
crease in its trading.67 The devaluation of the dollar made United States
goods more merchantable and the amount of exports increased remark-
ably: in 1971, United States exports were $42.8 billion; in 1972, $48.8
billion; in 1973, $70.3 billion; in 1974, $90 billion; and in 1975, $107
billion.68
The Treasury Department used a method to compare growth rates
of DISC and non-DISC exporters of United States goods,69 in which
certain basic assumptions were made. For example, it was assumed
that all other trading factors, e.g., floating exchange rates, dollar de-
valuation and inflation, would affect both types of exporters equally
or similarly. The difference in rates of growth and consequential growth
is assumed to be from DISC, either in terms of actual benefit or en-
couragement to trade. Finally, it was assumed that both DISC and
non-DISC exporters would tend to trade in similar products.Y This
assumption appears reasonable since many DISC and non-DISC ex-




68. OBR 1976 at 4, table 2; Alexander, Effects of a Devaluation on a Trade Balance,
11 IMF STAFF PAPERS (April 1952) at 263-78.
69. DISC REPORT I at 16; DISC REPORT II at 26; and DISC Rerpona II at 29-31.
70. Id. Similarity of products exported by DISC's and non-DISC's indicated in DISC
REPoRT III at 19, table 3-7; at 35, table 5-2; and at 36, table 5-3; OBR 1976.
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ports are, in fact, similar goods. The assumptions regarding similar
products are weighted and the effects are then estimated.
The DISC's used for the sample are those that supplied the govern-
ment with pre-DISC export information. The final weighted figures
show an effect of DISC on exports of $1.9 billion in 1973 and $4.6 bil-
lion in 1974.71 The Treasury estimates that DISC added approximately
230,000 jobs to the United States economy in 1974.72
These figures may be questioned when it is considered that the
revenue cost could have been used elsewhere and might have resulted
in some increases in employment. On the other hand, this figure fails
to take into account the effect of encouraging United States capital to
remain rather than to be used to invest in plants abroad, and thereby
offsets factors which tend to make the figures questionable. Therefore,
the figure can be accepted as a reasonable estimate.
The "revenue cost" is the amount of taxes not paid on the DISC
income because of the deferral of that income. In 1975, the revenue
cost of DISC was declared to be $1.5 billion.78 This amount was much
higher than first predicted,74 for several reasons.
First, exports have more than doubled since 1970. This rise was
well beyond expectations. The huge increase in exports was keyed
partly to the increase in world trade and partly to the devaluation of
the dollar. 75 Trade is greater because of the change in the international
trading market and because of the impetus of DISC.
A second cause of the greater revenue loss was that the exporters
had a greater profit margin than domestic producers so that the margins
were greater than those margins figured into the original estimates. It
should not be a surprise that the profit margins in exports tend to be
greater than those in domestic sales. The higher profit margins in
foreign trade are easily explained and even more easily explained for
DISC trade.
Foreign trade is a more risky biusiness than domestic trade since
there is less assurance that bills will be paid. Also, there is a longer
71. DISC REPORT III at 30.
72. Id. at 32-33.
73. Revenue cost for 1977 estimated to be $1.58 billion, DISC RElPonT III at 2, 23.
74. Id. at 9, original estimates of over one billion dollars of generated exports at a
cost of $450 to $600 million, Hearings on Tariff Trade Proposals Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., (1970) (testimony by David M. Kennedy,
See. of the Treasury) at 499, 524. But see 122 CoNG. Rac. S11,423 (1970). Estimated
cost was $170 million for 1973 while actual cost for 1973 was $720 million. For 1974
the cost was $750 million as reported in DISC REroaR III at 2, 20 and 23, table 4-1.
75. See note 65, supra at 29.
time frame in foreign sales and, therefore, a greater finance cost. The
DISC will not absorb this greater finance cost directly, so the DISC
will appear to be more profitable. The result is that exporters are only
willing to trade in goods which return a higher profit margin.
Another reason for the higher profit margin is that when a subsidy
is implemented resources do not immediately adjust and there will be
greater profit in the market receiving the subsidy.76 Once resources
have been reallocated in response to the subsidy, goods with lower
profit margins are traded and the profit margins will equalize out in
the overall picture of the export market. Then the over'all profit margins
will be lower.
77
In sum, it becomes clear that the revenue-loss projection figures are
misleading. One of the reasons is that the amount is a deferral, not an
exemption, and will be paid back over a period of time equal to two
years for every one year of DISC qualification, with up to ten years
of time for repayment. 78 Also, the figures take into account a nine
percent devaluation of the United States dollar, thereby showing a
greater profit within the first nine to eighteen months of the devalua-
tion than in the estimates. The original estimates did not anticipate the
devaluation. 79
The gain in exports was estimated to be $4.6 billion for 1974 be-
cause of DISC. This increase in exports resulted in approximately
230,000 additional jobs in the United States. A more difficult figure
to derive is the amount of capital that remained in the United States
as a result of the DISC legislation. Some corporate officers testified
before the House Ways and Means Committee that they either de-
layed investing abroad and built in the United States or delayed the
76. See note 7, supra.
77. Id. To warrant the export of goods barring those goods of unusual surpluses,
requires a profit margin great enough to encourage the manufacturer to risk selling in
an unknown market, to purchasers of different business practices. Wheh a subsidy is
applied to the export of goods, the necessary price or profit margin abroad can be less
and the encouragement remains for the manufacturer to enter the export market with
what would otherwise be a product with an inadequate profit margin. The addition of
the subsidy causes a lower profit margin on the sale abroad as the necessary threslbold
of willingness to export to the manufacturer. In time, the average profit margin from
sales abroad will be equivalent to the average profit margin from sales abroad before
the subsidy as the lower profit margin products are encouraged to be sold abroad.
78. I.R.C. § 995(b)(2)(B), the extension of the two years for every year of con-
secutive qualification for the prorated share of taxable distribution is a liberalization for
the one-for-one prorated return to the parent in § 995(b)(2)(B) prior to the T.R.A.
79. Hearings on Tariff and Trade Proposals Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., (1970) (testimony by David M. Kennedy, Sec. of the
Treasury) at 499; see DISC REoPRT I, Ch. 5.
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investment abroad to wait and see if DISC was advantageous and
permanent.80
In conjunction with the investment estimates, one should note the
utilization of capacity figures. Utilization of capacity is up, but his-
torically it is not high, even for DISC shareholders.8' The utilization
of capacity figure indicates whether producers are merely using the
facilities they already have at a greater level (more shifts per week,
at the cost of future production: more shifts means more depreciation
and less maintenance) or whether the greatei production stems from
increased investment in capital goods,
The determinatioii of whether the increased exports come primarily
from increased investment or increased use of capacity is important
for further analysis. Since the utilization of capacity figure is not ex-
traordinarily high, it may be inferred that the huge increase in exports
has come from an equally large increase in capital investment in export
producing facilities. Whether or not this is an increase in investment
in the United States at the cost of investment abroad should be found
by examining the comments of United States management 2 since look-
ing to the outflow of capital and nothing else is misleading where the
increases of world trade are at levels beyond expectation.
Another important factor necessary for analysis is whether the in-
creased export of goods has been wrought simply from domestic con-
sumption. To determine whether that shift has occurred, one aspect
to examine is the cost rise in goods to be exported compared to the
cost rise in goods which are not exportables. It is a matter of deter-
mining whether the increase in exports has caused any substantial
shortages which increase the domestic prices.
Looking to inflation of price figures indicates that the greatest in-
flation has occurred in imports.88 The figures tend to show that infla-
tion abroad is generally greater than inflation in the United States.
However, the greatest increase in prices has been in imported oil, which
has not been caused by inflation so much as by "cartelization." Imports
have risen in price over United States produced goods regardless of
80. See note 26, supra at 912; Hearings on Small Business Tax Reform Before the
Senate Comm. on Small Business, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., (1975) (testimony by Roger
Hill, Pres. of Gettys Mfg. Co., Inc.) at 63; Hill also surveyed twelve other companies
which made the same decision not to build abroad, id. at 65.
81. DISC REPoRT III at 33.
82. See note 80, supra, the management of many firms stated that because of DISC
they chose not to invest abroad at that time, but to increase domestic plant size and
export for the present.
83. HIGHLIGHTA oF U.S. ThADE, tables E7 and E9.
whether the United States goods are exportables or exclusively domes-
tic goods. Removing the import goods, then comparing the inflation
rates of goods which are strictly domestic to goods that DISC's export,
should demonstrate the effect of DISC on the availability of United
States consumer goods. Note that if, prior to DISC, the item was pri-
marily consumed domestically but is now exported without large price
increases, it would tend to show production in those goods has in-
creased. It might also demonstrate that economies of scale have been
reached because of the greater volume demanded domestically and
abroad.
The primary DISC exports are transportation equipment, machin-
ery, chemicals and grains. These goods are also the primary United
States exports. 4 DISC has not greatly distorted United States export
product composition, as indicated from the statistical data on DISC
exports and from the Department of Commerce, Highlights of United
States Exports and Imports. 5 Apparently DISC has been an overall
encouragement both in composition of exports and in geographic dis-
tribution. The price in grains has been greatly affected at times by
exports, but it would be inaccurate to say that the United States ex-
ports of grain were affected by DISC since grain exports are primarily
controlled by the government.
A subsidy for exports will usually cause a misallocation of resources
unless the subsidy is applied in an area where an imbalance exists and
that imbalance is directly affected by the subsidy. A discussion on the
misallocation of resources can be found in a student note entitled The
Case of the Slipped DISC?8 which cites an unpublished report by the
General Accounting Office (GAO) to the Honorable Charles Vanik,
Representative to the House of Representatives from Ohio.87 The note
points out, and the GAO report confirms, that DISC is exporting re-
sources which are scarce. The note contended that world demand is
greater than the world supply at present and, as a result, the goods are
scarce and should not 'be exported.88 It seems the author meant that
the quantity demand at the time was greater than the quantity supplied
84. DISC REP RT III at 14 & 15, table 3-3; Hiciumcirrs OF U.S. TnA table E7.
85. See generally, HicMaICMs OF U.S. TRADE.
86. 6 CAL. WsT. INTrL L. J. 154 (1975).
87. Vanik was an opponent of DISC from the outset. His greatest concern was that
DISC would be a handout to large corporations. See Hearings, supra, note 20 at 524-35.
88. Derived from the report by the General Accounting Office, Report of the Hon.
Charles A. Vanik on DISC's being used as Tax Loopholes in Wheat and Agriculturat
Transactions (Unpublished, May 29, 1974).
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since much of his discussion related to manufactured goods which
required a reallocation of rdsources.
Within the same article the author complained of DISC's not lower-
ing the price of the goods. Taking both of these postures is inconsistent.
If DISC caused international trading of scarce resources where the
quantity demanded is greater than the quantity supplied then the price
will increase, it will not decline. Since prices of domestic goods and
exports have been concurrently rising at similar rates, it is questionable
whether the exports are goods which are scarce.80 Rather, the goods
which DISC encourages to be exported are goods that either do not
have a sufficiently high profit margin to be traded or are not in great
enough surplus to be cheaply sold abroad. It appears that the increase
in United States exports has not resulted from domestic consumption
nor from an increase in utilization of capacity. Instead, the increase
comes from increased production using new capital investment.
Congressman Mills and several other commentators have raised
fears that DISC would not lower, or has not lowered, prices on exports
in order to stimulate exports.90 The question this fear alludes to is
whether the factor keeping United States products from going abroad
was that they were not price competitive or whether there was insuffi-
cient quantity demanded at the established price to develop enough
profit to compensate the exporter for the risks of exporting. Along with
the devaluation of the dollar and the resultant lower prices of United
States goods abroad, the existence of DISC decreased the export risk
to a level equivalent to risks resulting from other nations' tax policies.
Therefore, greater United States sales and greater product line sales
abroad were encouraged.
If prices of United States goods dropped because of a tax break,
it would be equivalent to a United States consumer subsidy of foreign
consumers.0' In the case of DISC, the result is a subsidy of exporters
89. IMF, INTERNAroNAL FINANCIAL STAtnsTics (1976).
90. See note 86, supra; see also Hearings, supra note 1, at 2438-2481.
91. When the subsidy lowers the price of the exported goods abroad Instead of
making other non-exported goods profitable enough to export, it encourages exporting
more of the same goods but does not encourage other goods to enter the International
market. The cost abroad is lower, with the difference in the price being made up by the
subsidizing government; the taxpayers of that government are paying for the lower con-
sumer prices abroad. The quantity demanded of the goods which were profitable enough
to export before the subsidy is increased because of the lower price and the possibility
arises of shortages of those goods at the present domestic price. It is better to Increase
the profit margin by a subsidy than to increase the quantity the manufacturers are willing
to supply at the present price if the desire of the svbsidy is to increase capital Investment
for production.
without a lowering of prices which, over time, means a greater product
line will be exported. Goods which would not otherwise be exported
will now be exported.
Another question to consider is whether it is beneficial to export
goods which would not be exported but for a subsidy. It is not helpful
to subsidize exports merely for normal trade since it muddies the
comparative advantages of trade. The United States exports goods that,
on a comparative scale, either should be produced elsewhere or not
be traded at all.92 Of course, if the implicit intent of the Administration
and Congress is that there was to be an increase in exports to pay for
the rise in expenditures of foreign oil, then the reallocation of resources
in an otherwise uneconomical distribution is more easily understood
and is also more acceptable. 93
It is fair to say that there has been an appreciable increase in
facilities for the purpose of producing goods which are exported.-DISC
also causes an increase in capital investment to some extent, with an
insignificant amount of the exports being drawn from domestic sup-
plies. The reallocation of resources might upset the more advantageous
trading position, but that position has already been upset by the oil
market.9
4
In the Third Annual Report on DISC it is noted that over seventy
percent of United States exports are channeled through a DISC. The
data also indicates that the greatest share of exports are traded by
large firms.9n It is natural that the United States exports which have
grown most substantially over the last five years are those traded by
large firms. Grain exports have grown significantly over the past five
years, though the reason for that growth has been due to the weather
and the Eastern Bloc's greater willingness to trade with the West.
Changes in grain exports should, therefore, be excluded from an analy-
sis of DISC characteristics except to note that most of the trade with
the Soviet Bloc has been grain. Grain exporters tend to be large collec-
92. Id. See also note 7, supra.
93. LETICHE, BALANCE OF PAYMENrS AND EcoNo, tic Gnow-n (1959); H. H.x.En,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (1973) at 147 et Seq.
94. 1975 IMF ANN. Ra. The most advantageous trading posture is to allow the
comparative advantage of production in each nation, as explained in note 7 supra, to
dictate the goods which would be traded. The theory essentially entails the comparison
of resources in one area, which must be given up to produce another product, to a
similar comparison of resources in another area. When the relative capabilities in one
area are found, it can be shown that another area, which can produce all of the stated
goods more cheaply, can receive benefit by trading the goods which are cheapest to
produce per resources for another area's cheapest goods.
95. DISC REPORT III at 26, table 4-4, see also 21.
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tives, co-operatives or associations, and trade with the Soviet Bloc
recently has been almost entirely through DISC's2o
The experiences with the Eastern Bloc strengthen the theory that
primarily the large exporters will first take advantage of legislation
like DISC. Another indication that the smaller exporters are not as
quick to adjust to DISC is the slowness in the shift to the use of DISC
for exports to Canada. The use of DISC for trade with Canada, com-
pared to other geographic destinations is less, possibly since it is easier
for small exporters to export to Canada because less major organization
is required and there are fewer expenses of foreign wholesalers with
which to deal. With the exception of agriculture, DISC has not pro-
duced an abnormal rise in quantity for certain products compared to
the rise of non-DISC exports from the United States and over time
the balance should improve with the smaller exporters utilizing DISC.
There are two general effects upon other nations of an export sub-
sidy. One effect is that the subsidized product competes on the world
market with the product of another nation. Another effect is that pur-
chases of the subsidized product by other nations are either less ex-
pensive or in greater quantity. There are many secondary effects which
cannot be discussed further here.
If DISC generally encourages United States exports to increase
without a rise in price, the competitive effect will most strongly be felt
in the developed nations since the United States exports are primarily
manufactured goods. The bulk of United States food exports are basic
foods such as grains,97 which are exported by only a few countries. The
less developed countries do not export grains or other basic foodstuffs;
hence, again, the impetus of DISC is not competitive with the less
developed countries.
The competitive effects of DISC are upon the nations most likely
to complain, which are those nations that trade heavily in manufac-
tured goods with other developed nations. The complaints to GATT
were from nations such as France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.",,
The degree of increased competition by United States goods caused
by DISC is difficult to measure. The effect of having a greater quantity
of a product available is more difficult to analyze than is the degree of
increased competition.
Nations prefer to trade in a market with more competition because
it holds the price of imports down. A monopoly will result in higher
96. DISC REPORT III at 19, table 3-3.
97. OBR 1976, tables 4 and 7; see also HICIILIcITS OF U.S. TRADE.
98. 4 TAx NoTEs No. 49 at 2 (1976).
prices than a system of many sellers. If a nation chooses to develop
its manufacturing sector beyond its present capabilities of growth effi-
ciency in a purely economic sense, it will desire many willing sellers
of construction equipment and other machinery. The development of
a nation's manufacturing sector in the earliest stages requires equip-
ment and machinery for the construction of transportation facilities
and manufacturing plants. Before any manufacturing begins, all heavy
equipment must be imported.
When the United States increased its participation in world trade,
a greater amount of its product was available. This increased participa-
tion tended to keep the price lower than it would otherwise have been
because the amount of equipment desired by developing countries was
over and above the existing demand by the developed countries. When
a nation with an economy as large and diverse as the United States
encourages exports, generally it will mean a greater availability of
products to its trading partners. Until the less developed countries
create a producing and exporting sector, this greater availability of
goods is helpful unless a supply-pull demand situation occurs and a
nation wishes to retard its imports because of an imbalance in trade.
A supply-pull demand essentially is the influx of a product which en-
courages its use and thereby develops a demand for a product where
earlier no such demand existed.
An increase in goods, such as soft drinks, is not viewed as a positive
occurrence in some less developed countries struggling to meet their
energy bill, but the availability of medium-weight machinery, equip-
ment and special chemicals is a positive end product from export in-
creases encouraged by DISC. According to studies of overall changes
in the product class of United States exports with similar involvement
through DISCs, most have not been exported to a larger extent be-
cause of DISC. The area of export growth due to DISC is partly in
the marginal zones, which do not consist of scarce products, but lower
profit margin products. 99
The effects of DISC upon other nations can be aggregated and seen
from another perspective: that of the world trade left to the less de-
veloped countries. The United States position in the trading world has
not changed substantially since 1971 in its percentage share of world
exports. 100 The United States share has risen from about eighteen per-
cent to just over twenty-one percent of the western trading world
99. See note 91, supra.
100. IMF, INTRNATiONAL FiNANcwtL STATImSCS (August 1976). United States ex-
ports rose from 18.2 percent in 1971 to 21.3 percent in 1975.
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exports. During the five year period following 1970, world trade greatly
increased and United States imports nearly kept pace with the United
States exports. 0 1 It should be noted, however, that United States im-
ports have been increasingly dominated by oil and gas, so that the
amount of all other imports has not been growing as rapidly.
The oil producing nations have increased their imports since rais-
ing the price of their crude oil, but the exports of the OPEC nations
are still well beyond the total value of their imports. In a matter of a
few short years the OPEC nations have garnered a significantly greater
share of the world exports.1'0 2
Since gross trade has increased so dramatically, it is not necessarily
undesirable that the percentage share of world exports of less devel-
oped countries is down. The potential evil is that their exports are not
up as much as their energy-weighted imports2 °a The economies of
less developed countries cannot adjust to changing trading patterns
as quickly as the American economy has shown it can, nor as quickly
as the price of OPEC oil.
Most less developed countries supply either special agricultural
products or natural resources on the world market. Without a growing
demand for their product or a highly inelastic demand schedule, the
less developed countries cannot increase the quantity or the price for
which their goods are sold sufficiently to pay their bills. There are
exceptions to this plight, as has been shown with coffee, a product
with a moderately inelastic demand schedule. There were gratuitous
circumstances surrounding the rise in coffee prices for many countries,
since the rise resulted from a decrease in the quantity supplied caused
by the heavy freeze in Brazil, the world's largest coffee producing state.
The price has gone up and the amount any other nation can sell is
the same as before at the new, higher price.
The less developed countries have kept their trade imbalance rela-
tively stable partly because of the special programs of different in-
ternational organizations such as OPEC, GATT and the OECD. The
United States has shown some concern for less developed countries
and their special circumstances, e.g., legislation in the Revenue Code
encouraging certain types of trade in the less developed countries. 104
101. Id.; HIGHLIGHTS OF U.S. TRADE, tables 1-4.
102. IMF, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS (August 1976).
103. Energy weighted imports means that even though the import of oil lia increased
in value in the less developed countries, the gross value of imports has not proportion-
ately risen. Therefore, the import of oil becomes a greater and greater share of the less
developed countries imports.
104. I.R.C. § 902(d).
It is difficult to say that DISC was instrumental in putting the
less developed countries into a negative economic and trade posture.
If a supply-pull demand situation was created by more United States
products being exported, because of DISC, then a definitive harm
would have occurred if the less developed country, for policy reasons,
did not wish present consumption of those United States goods.
There is little evidence directly on point as to whether any forded
increase in other nations' imports of United States goods has occurred.
Considering the figures which tend to indicate a general increase in
United States exports and not one of a specific product's growth, it
appears safe to say that DISC has not caused major problems with the
trading partners of the United States.1'7
Because of the resource misallocation caused, it is questionable
that the purpose of increasing exports would warrant the DISC legis-
lation.10 , The type of marginal United States goods exported and the
guidance of capital movement cause resource misallocation. However,
the desired gQals of combatting the tax advantages of other nations,
of encouraging United States producers to export by realizing the po-
tential of exporting, and of generally increasing exports to pay for the
greater energy bill may have been substantial enough to warrant DISC
as amended or even as originally proposed.
Some critics insist that DISC has performed poorly.10, A big factor
is the business communities' disbelief in the permanence of the legis-
lation. The domestic company which invests abroad is less likely to
invest domestically and smaller marginal producers are less likely to
invest in developing export markets for their goods if they believe
the legislation is soon to be repealed or if it appears to have an un-
determined future. The goods once again become non-export goods
economically once the legislation is repealed.
The smaller producers of goods were not as quick to take advantage
of DISC and many did not export. The ones that did export found the
complications of DISC too much to deal with and waited to see if the
system would prove to be advantageous.
If the new legislation on DISC were to provide some assurance of
permanence or set a definite life of five years or more, the smaller
producers would gain confidence and would be encouraged to become
involved in exporting. In order to fulfill the goal of having producers
105. OBR 1976, table 4.
106. See notes 7 and 77, supra.
107. CoNG. REC. Sl1,174 (daily ed. June 30, 1976), Sen. Haskell at S11,174-S11,187.
Similar sentiment was voiced throughout discu.sions of DISC on the floors of Congress.
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"think export," a longer time frame is necessary to reach the smaller
producers.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the United States economy could continue to grow as it did
around the turn of the century, nearly independent of foreign trade,
then a wall of quotas would be possible even though world opinion of
such action would be unfavorable. However, since the United States
has an insatiable desire for certain foreign products, it is unlikely that
independent growth is an option or even a possibility. With the price
of OPEC oil up ana with United States consumption of, and reliance
upon, foreign oil steadily increasing, a removal of an export encour-
agement without the removal of the encouragements of other nations
would be a mistake, despite present misallocations of resources.
Through GATT all export subsidies should be removed. But until
GATT is enforced, an encouragement for a greater portion of the
United States economy to export is reasonable and should help the
United States adjust to greater world trading. Since a major factor
implicit in DISC is to get United States producers to "think export,"
a period of years should be set, so that the smaller producers will also
be encouraged to "think export."
